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Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL ON Economic Activity held its eighty-ﬁrst confer-
ence in Washington, D.C., on March 30 and 31, 2006. This issue of the
Brookings Papers includes the papers and discussions presented at the
conference. The ﬁrst paper takes a new approach to assessing the boom in
home prices, using a model that parallels the one commonly used to value
assets such as stocks. The second analyzes labor force participation and its
determinants and projects future labor force growth. The third examines
changes in wealth by age group and relates them to changes in law and the
economy and to demographic characteristics. The fourth examines the
present defined-benefits pension system and considers how to reform its
regulation and insurance by the federal government. 
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS THE hallmark of a bubble is an asset that is priced
far above its fundamental value, which depends on the discounted stream of
future cash ﬂows—earnings, dividends, or interest. Differences of opinion
about whether or not a bubble exists reﬂect differences of opinion about the
fundamental value of the asset. In the case of owner-occupied housing,
there is no readily available, easily estimated analogue to cash flow, and
therefore opinions about fundamental value can differ widely. Many
observers and market participants have instead focused on the behavior of
prices themselves as a way of assessing whether “irrational exuberance”
exists in the housing market. During the past ﬁve years housing prices have
more than doubled in some metropolitan markets and have risen by 
50 percent for the United States overall, leading many to conclude that
there is a speculative bubble in housing. Those holding this view cite as 
evidence the sheer magnitude of the price increases, the rise in the ratio of
average housing prices to average income, and the more rapid growth of
home prices than of rents. In the first article of this volume, Margaret
Hwang Smith and Gary Smith argue that all of these are ﬂawed indicators
ixof a housing bubble because they do not measure prices relative to funda-
mental values. Using data they have collected on individual homes in ten
metropolitan areas, they calculate such a measure from the capitalized
value of the stream of services that a home provides. They conclude that, in
nearly all the markets they study, home prices remain near or below
fundamental values. 
The authors note that many of the features associated with a bubble as
the term is commonly used—prices rising rapidly, a speculative focus on
future price increases rather than the asset’s cash flow, and the likelihood
of an eventual price collapse—could also be present in a bubble defined
relative to fundamental values. But not necessarily. Prices can increase
rapidly for a considerable period and still remain below fundamental val-
ues, as they are likely to do when a significant, unexpected drop in mort-
gage rates both increases fundamental values and leads to rapid price
increases. The authors stress that housing prices are not determined in a
smoothly functioning, efficient market rooted in fundamentals. Instead
they are inﬂuenced importantly by “comps,” or the prices of recently pur-
chased comparable homes; appraisers, real estate agents, and buyers and
sellers themselves all rely heavily on data from these “comps.” In this sit-
uation, speculative behavior can lead to rapid price increases or to price
declines, and the corrective pull of fundamentals may be very weak. Hence
the authors see their calculations as most directly relevant to individuals
deciding whether to buy or rent, rather than to those deciding whether to
buy or sell now rather than later. They themselves believe that short-run
price movements are hard to predict, irrespective of the relationship
between current prices and fundamental values, so that market timing is
quite risky. 
The authors provide an extensive discussion of what they call “bub-
blemetrics,” arguing that most of the measures commonly used to label
the current housing situation a bubble are flawed. These include the per-
vasive use of aggregate measures that ignore the heterogeneity of homes,
differences in location and quality, and the use of overly simple measures
of affordability. They note that the conclusions of more sophisticated
regression models depend on the implicit assumption that the historical
samples of home prices used in the analysis are randomly distributed
around fundamental values. Given that assumption, systematic deviations
of current prices from predictions generated by these regressions can be
regarded as evidence that prices have wandered away from fundamental
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may have been too low, so that recent price increases may have simply
brought them more in line with fundamentals. They are also critical of
studies that simply look at the ratio of prices to rents or compare their
rates of growth, because these ignore the many factors that should in prin-
ciple affect the price-to-rent ratio, including interest rates, tax laws, and
the nonlinear relationships among these variables. They also note that
the dwellings sampled in rent indices are typically dissimilar to those
sampled in sale price indices, so that the comparison becomes one of
apples to oranges. 
In the authors’model the basic measures used to evaluate whether hous-
ing is overpriced are net present value (NPV), fundamental value (P*),
and the internal rate of return (IRR). The NPVis the sum of the present val-
ues of all “cash ﬂows,” including the purchase price and associated mort-
gage costs, on the minus side, and the value of the housing services
provided, on the plus side. When the NPV is positive, purchasing a home
is preferable to renting, and when negative, renting is the better choice. The
fundamental value (P*) is simply the price that would imply a zero NPV.
The premium is the excess of P* over the actual price (P), expressed as a
percentage. The required rate of return used in these calculations to dis-
count future flows should in principle depend on rates of return, adjusted
for risk, on the investments forgone because of the home purchase. The IRR
is a hypothetical annual discount rate that would make the NPV and the
premium zero.
The authors present simple models showing the algebra of present value
calculations and the relationship among these variables. Calculations using
these models make it clear that the relationships between the NPV, the dis-
count rate, and the growth rate of net cash ﬂow are highly nonlinear. These
nonlinearities imply that many empirical models are misspecified. For
example, for long horizons, with zero growth in cash ﬂows, a reduction in
the discount rate from 6 percent to 4 percent increases the present value
by approximately half; yet with a growth rate in net cash flow of 2 per-
cent, the same change in rates doubles the present value. The simple model
also shows how a mortgage, by leveraging the homeowner’s equity,
increases the fundamental value and the rate of return so long as the mort-
gage rate is less than the homeowner’s required, unleveraged rate of return.
The realistic calculations that the authors later make for their sample are
more complicated than those just described, because they account for
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necessarily grow at the same rate, and the fact that conventional mort-
gages are amortized, which implies that loan balances and tax-deductible
interest costs decline over time. 
How does one measure the net cash flow required to compute funda-
mental value when the housing services for owner-occupied housing are
not priced? The authors do this by assuming that buying and renting
comparable homes are often viable alternatives. Hence, for their empirical
work, they use the observed cost of renting a home as a measure of the
services received by the owner-occupier of a comparable home—this rental
cost that the owner-occupier avoids is the parallel to gross cash flow
produced by typical investment assets. The authors allow for future changes
in rents by calculating them for a range of realistic rental growth rates. They
acknowledge the existence (but do not take account) of other differences
between renting and owning, such as control over furnishings and décor,
greater beneﬁts from investments in improvements, and greater privacy; all
these factors suggest that using only avoided rent to measure the beneﬁts of
ownership is likely to understate fundamental value. 
Converting gross to net cash ﬂow requires subtracting a variety of costs.
The authors make an extraordinary effort to use realistic estimates of all the
important costs of home ownership—including brokerage fees, closing
costs, maintenance, insurance, property taxes, and mortgage costs—and to
allow for the housing subsidies implicit in state and federal income tax
policy. Estimating mortgage costs requires assumptions about interest rates,
points (a percentage of the sale price assessed by the lender at closing),
and other terms of a mortgage. Since property taxes, mortgage interest,
and points are tax-deductible, the authors also take account of differences
in state and local tax rates.
For their empirical analysis, the authors assemble rent and sale price data
on carefully matched pairs of rented and owner-occupied single-family
homes. Using data for homes purchased in the summer of 2005, they match
these homes with rental homes that are similar in terms of size, amenities,
and location. In a relatively small number of cases they ﬁnd exact matches,
where an owner-occupied home was bought and then rented, or vice versa.
Data were collected in ten metropolitan areas, including some where price
increases had been among the highest in the nation, such as Boston, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco, and others where the increases had been below
average, such as Dallas, Indianapolis, and New Orleans. In some areas
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their study to relatively homogeneous neighborhoods.
For each purchased home in their sample, the authors compute the
NPV and other measures for a variety of assumptions about discount
rates, future growth in rents on the matched rental property, and how
long the buyer of a home expects to own it. For the base case they assume
a 3 percent annual increase in housing rents and expenses and a 6 percent
required after-tax rate of return, a 20 percent down payment, a thirty-year
mortgage with a 5.7 percent ﬁxed annual mortgage rate (the average thirty-
year rate in mid-July 2005), closing costs equal to 0.5 percent of the sale
price, annual maintenance costs equal to 1 percent of the sale price, and a
6 percent transaction cost to the seller if the home is sold. The federal
marginal income tax rate is assumed to be 28 percent, and the capital
gains rate is assumed to be 15 percent on gains above $500,000. State
and metropolitan-area data are used for property taxes, state income taxes,
and home insurance. 
Because of the signiﬁcant transaction costs involved in buying and sell-
ing a home, the NPV and the IRR are sensitive to the length of the holding
period, particularly for short horizons. Although the authors compute these
variables for a wide range of holding periods, they focus on two cases: an
infinite horizon and a ten-year horizon. They observe that the infinite
horizon is more relevant than it might seem at ﬁrst and avoids the need to
assume a selling price. In particular, for horizons of twenty or thirty years,
transaction costs are of minor importance, and for a homeowner who con-
templates changing homes but remaining in the same metropolitan area,
changes in local home prices may be of minor importance: selling high
means buying high, and vice versa. In the base case for finite horizons, it
is assumed that the price at the time of sale has grown at 3 percent a year.
The results of the calculations are in striking contrast to widespread
opinion. Although, on average, prices on homes in San Mateo County,
California (just south of San Francisco), greatly exceed fundamental val-
ues, in the other markets average prices are either roughly in line with or
below fundamental values. For a homebuyer in San Mateo with a discount
rate of 6 percent, the average home is 54 percent overvalued at an inﬁnite
horizon, and 42 percent overvalued at a ten-year horizon. The correspond-
ing IRRs are well below the required rate of return. However, prices in
Orange County, California, are roughly in line with fundamentals, and
homes in Los Angeles, San Bernardino County, Boston, and Chicago
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xiiiappear somewhat underpriced. Home prices in Atlanta, Dallas, India-
napolis, and New Orleans are substantially below their calculated funda-
mental values. In Indianapolis, where the average rent is about half what it
is in Boston and sale prices are about one-fourth, the authors’calculations
show fundamental values to be roughly triple market prices. In other words,
in all but one of the markets they investigate, the authors calculate that
housing prices are near or below (sometimes well below) fundamental
values; purchasing a home does not need to be rationalized by a belief in
rapid and unsustainable further price increases. 
The use of individual matched pairs enables the authors to estimate the
distribution of price premiums, not just the mean. Not surprisingly, there
is substantial variance in these premiums. Although it is hard to find a
bargain in San Mateo, in Orange County there are almost as many homes
selling below fundamental value as selling above.
Estimates of fundamental value depend crucially on assumed growth
rates for rents and, for short horizons, growth rates of prices. The authors
check the robustness of their base case results for ten-year and infinite
horizons, calculating the values for annual growth rates in rent of 2, 3, and
4 percent (which cover the range of actual growth rates across the ten
metropolitan areas during 1985–2005), and for growth rates in sale prices
of 0, 3, and 6 percent. They show that the extremes imply large differences
from the base case, but that for most variations the qualitative conclusions
hold. If the annual growth rate of rents were permanently 4 percent—
approximately the growth rate in the historical period in Boston, Chicago,
and the four California markets—home prices in all these areas, even San
Mateo, would be financially justified with an infinite horizon, and prices
in all areas except San Mateo and Orange County would be justified with
annual rent increases of 3 percent. Prices in Atlanta, Dallas, Indianapolis,
and New Orleans are justiﬁed even with an annual growth rate of rents of
only 2 percent. In Indianapolis the IRR exceeds 13 percent for both hori-
zons even assuming no growth in either rents or prices.
Although uncertainty about growth in rents is the major risk for a home-
buyer with a long horizon who takes out a thirty-year ﬁxed-rate mortgage,
uncertainty about the future sale price becomes more important as the
horizon shortens. The authors provide schedules showing the IRR for the
full spectrum of horizons and a variety of rates of price growth. These
show, for example, that for a ten-year horizon, if prices do not increase at
all and rents grow at only 2 percent a year, only four of the ten markets have
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30 percent in all the others. 
The authors further explore the risks from uncertainty about the growth
rates of prices and rents by conducting Monte Carlo simulations for a
representative house in the Los Angeles area, using stochastic processes for
rents and prices estimated for the period 1983–2004. The risks are greatest
for intermediate horizons and are quite substantial. The authors choose as
their representative home one that has a sale price of $571,098 and an
NPV of $25,539 under the base case assumptions. For a ten-year horizon
the simulations indicate a 16 percent chance that the NPVwill be –$50,000
or less, and a 4 percent chance that it will be –$100,000 or less. The prob-
ability of these extreme negative outcomes is roughly offset by that of
extreme positive outcomes; median NPV is trivially different from that in
the base case.
Changes in mortgage rates have very large effects on fundamental
values. Homeowners with long-term, ﬁxed-rate mortgages are effectively
insulated from the risks of such changes until they sell, and indeed they
beneﬁt from the option to reﬁnance if rates fall. However, uncertainty about
rates increases the risks to homeowners with variable-rate mortgages.
Monte Carlo simulations using an estimated stochastic process for rates
show that this added risk is worth taking into account but is small relative
to the risks associated with growth of rents and prices. Of course, the fun-
damental value of the home at the time of sale, and its sale price if prices
move with fundamentals, are signiﬁcantly affected by future rate changes. 
The possibility that Congress might change the tax treatment of mort-
gage interest, as proposed, for example, by the President’s Advisory Panel
on Federal Tax Reform in 2005, poses another risk to homeowners. The
authors calculate that, for a ten-year horizon, replacing current deductibility
with a 15 percent tax credit, even without a cap on the credit of the type
proposed, would reduce the median estimates of fundamental value across
cities by 11 to 17 percent, and complete elimination of the tax preference
would reduce it by 20 to 30 percent. 
If the authors’central ﬁndings are correct, what explains the extraordi-
nary increases in housing prices over the last ﬁve years, and how can they
fail to be far above fundamental values after such a rise? In the authors’
model, one way is that fundamentals may also have grown rapidly over the
period as a result of some combination of mortgage and discount rate reduc-
tions and growth in rents. Another is that housing prices were low relative to
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Determining the relative importance of these two factors is difﬁcult given
the lack of historical information on prices and rents. The authors manage to
gather matched rental and sale data in the Los Angeles metropolitan area
for 2001–04. Calculating fundamental values as before, but using historical
values for the model’s key parameters, they ﬁnd that home prices three to
ﬁve years ago were roughly 40 percent below fundamental values. In 2004
this gap between fundamental values and prices was more than halved,
falling to a level roughly in line with their results for 2005. 
To extend their calculations to earlier years, for which they do not have
data on individual homes, the authors use the housing price index
constructed by the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’owner’s equivalent rent index to backcast to
1983 the annual prices and rentals for a home with the average character-
istics of their 2001 sample. Their results are again striking. In 1983, even
with a thirty-year mortgage rate of roughly 13 percent and what was then
a conservative 3 percent expected growth rate of rents, sale prices were 
14 percent below fundamental values. In 1984, with the rise in mortgage
rates to 14.7 percent, this discount fell to 4 percent. Then, as mortgage rates
started falling, the discount at ﬁrst rose rapidly and then disappeared with
the near doubling of home prices between 1985 and 1990. With the
continuing decline in rates and the decline in home prices in the early
1990s, prices again fell below fundamental values. Despite rapid growth
in sale prices after 1996, the gap remained large, shrinking to less than 10
percent only after 2003, when mortgage rates stopped falling. The authors
observe that for the entire eleven-year period 1993–2003, buying clearly
dominated renting for households with long horizons.
Forecasts of the change in the price premium from 2001 to 2005,
derived using the price and rent indices from the above exercise, closely
follow the authors’estimated change based on their data from matched
pairs. This suggests the usefulness of using the same method for back-
casting from the 2005 matched-pair data for their other markets. The pat-
tern of intertemporal changes in fundamental value is quite similar across
markets, largely reﬂecting the fact that changes in interest rates and federal
taxes are common to all. However, the changes in market prices are quite
different: San Mateo prices are quite volatile and more often above than
below fundamental values. The patterns for San Bernardino County,
Orange County, and Los Angeles are quite similar, with prices generally
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by a falling off and then an eventual closing of the gap. In Boston,
Chicago, and Dallas, sale prices were close to fundamental values for
much of the 1980s and have lagged behind since. In Atlanta and Indi-
anapolis, prices remained well below fundamental values over the entire
twenty-three-year period. 
The authors conclude by observing that if the essential feature of a bub-
ble is that prices rise far above fundamental values, there was no bubble in
the prices of single-family homes in 2005. However, they do not claim
that housing prices are always aligned with fundamental values, and indeed
they suggest it would take a very peculiar set of assumptions to place fun-
damental values in the middle of the fluctuating market prices of the past
twenty-three years in any of the ten markets they examine. They believe
this helps explain how, despite rapidly rising prices, prices can be still
below or near fundamental values in many urban areas. For potential buy-
ers who plan to stay in the same area for many years, the relevant question
is not whether prices have risen rapidly, nor even how fast they expect them
to rise in the future, but whether at current prices the home is a
fundamentally sound investment. For the typical home in nine of the
authors’ten markets, their answer is yes.
THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION rate measures the percentage of the
working-age population that is in the labor force, either employed or look-
ing for work. Understanding variations in participation rates is useful
both for analyzing the economy’s long-run growth prospects and for inter-
preting the degree of slack or tightness in labor markets at a point in time.
Over a business cycle, participation rises when jobs are plentiful and falls
when jobs are hard to find. Over longer intervals, the trend in participation
is affected by changes in the age distribution of the population and by
policy and societal changes that affect people’s desire and incentives to
work and the hiring practices of firms. The participation rate rose almost
without interruption from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, mainly as a
result of the large number of women joining the labor force. After falling
in the recession of the early 1990s and recovering in the subsequent expan-
sion, participation fell noticeably between 2000 and 2005. In the second
article in this volume, Stephanie Aaronson, Bruce Fallick, Andrew Figura,
Jonathan Pingle, and William Wascher examine the variations in the par-
ticipation rate over the past several decades in order to identify what has
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going forward.
Labor force participation varies predictably over the life cycle. The
working-age population is, by convention, deﬁned as persons 16 years and
older, and participation rates are lower for the youngest and the oldest
age groups than for those in between, with ages 25–54 being the peak
participation years. This general pattern is observed for both men and
women, and the typical variation over the life cycle is large enough that the
demographic bubble of the baby-boom cohorts has had a pronounced
effect on overall participation rates as those cohorts have moved through
the life cycle. While conforming to this general pattern, actual participa-
tion for each age group has trended higher or lower for extended periods in
response to economic and societal changes that impact some age-sex
groups differently than others. The authors capture these features in a
regression model that allows them to decompose the participation of each
age-sex group into four parts: a typical age profile of participation; an
average birth cohort effect that shifts this age profile according to when
individuals were born; the separate effects of a number of “structural”
variables that capture economic and social changes that inﬂuence different
age groups (or, equivalently, different birth cohorts) at various points in
time; and business cycle effects.
The authors assemble quarterly data starting in 1977 that are disaggre-
gated by age and sex. The data come from the monthly Current Population
Survey along with its Annual Demographic Supplement and include
unpublished micro data. The authors divide the observations into fourteen
age categories, ranging from 16- and 17-year-olds to persons aged 70 and
older; they model males and females separately, resulting in twenty-eight
separate regression equations, each explaining participation rates for a
single age-sex group. The authors sketch the evolution of various economic
and social changes that are likely to have had an effect on participation, and
they select time-varying structural variables to capture such effects in their
regressions. They organize their variables into three categories: human
capital, ﬁnancing of nonparticipation, and family structure. Human capital
variables include, for ages 16–24, returns to a college education; for older
age groups they include average educational attainment when a cohort
was 27 years old; and for 18- to 61-year-old women they include the
female-male gap in weekly earnings. Variables measuring ﬁnancing of non-
participation include sex-speciﬁc life expectancy at age 65 (as a measure of
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Security’s old-age and disability insurance provisions. (Some measures of
wealth were also tried but were found to have no explanatory power.)
Family structure variables are the presence of children under age 6 and the
percentage of women (in each age group between 18 and 61) who are
married. Business cycle effects are captured by deviations of output from
a trend generated using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. 
The regressions find significant effects of the business cycle on labor
force participation for most age-sex groups. The effects are positive and
large—lowering participation in slack economies and raising it in booms—
for the youngest (ages 16–24) and the oldest males (ages 60 and over) and
for females up to age 44. The effects are small for 35- to 59-year-old men,
indicating very strong attachment to the labor force in those years, and,
interestingly, they are negative for 55- to 64-year-old women. For their
structural variables, the authors report the effect on aggregate participa-
tion of a 1-standard-deviation change in each. Since most are relevant only
to particular age-sex groups, most of the effects calculated in this way are
modest. Aggregate participation is moved by 0.1 percentage point or more
by a 1-standard-deviation change in returns to education, eventual college
attainment, life expectancy, the female-male earnings ratio, the marriage
rate, and the presence of children under 6. The largest effect is a negative
1.5 percentage points from women being married, and the second largest
is 0.4 percentage point from having graduated from college. As the authors
observe, the inevitable imprecision of their variables in capturing the social
and economic changes that matter, including the difficulty of properly
aligning their timing, affects these estimates. Nonetheless, along with the
cyclical variable and the average cohort and age effects, the regressions
track the actual movements of participation reasonably well, with only the
youngest and the oldest age groups showing regression errors as large as
1 percentage point. 
By eliminating cyclical effects, the authors produce estimated partici-
pation trends over time for each age group. (For the youngest there are not
enough observations to allow separation of cohort and cyclical effects,
and so cohort effects are extrapolated from earlier cohorts.) For most male
age groups, participation trends have declined fairly steadily over the past
thirty years; the exception is older men, whose participation trend has risen
since the 1980s. Trends among females have been far more volatile. The
over-55 groups have had rising trends since the 1980s, those aged 25–54
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decline since, and the youngest groups have had a generally declining trend
since the early 1980s. 
Aggregating these results by weighting individual trends by population
weights in each year, the authors estimate trends in participation through
2005 for the total population and for males and females separately. These
broader trends are importantly inﬂuenced by the typical life-cycle pattern of
participation and the shifting age distribution of the population over time.
The estimated aggregate trend peaked in 2002 and has declined noticeably
since. More than half of this decline is due to the aging of the baby-
boomers, who are beginning to move from high- to low-participation age
groups. Although there is uncertainty about other determinants of future
participation, such as the number and age composition of immigrants and
changes in participation within age groups, this ongoing demographic shift
toward an aging population will almost surely dominate, producing declin-
ing participation rates for decades. 
Going beyond this general characterization of the future, the authors
use their disaggregated analysis to provide a quantitative range of projec-
tions for participation rates. These make use of the separate identiﬁcation of
age (life-cycle) effects, ﬁxed birth cohort effects, and time-varying effects
from structural variables in their model. In their baseline projection, for
cohorts already 16 and older at the end of their sample period, they hold
cohort effects constant and age these cohorts according to their latest esti-
mates of age (life-cycle) effects. For their structural variables they allow
life expectancy to evolve in line with Census Bureau projections and
assume that educational attainment for cohorts currently younger than 
27 changes at the same rate as that of recent cohorts. Other structural vari-
ables are held at their end-of-sample values. For cohorts entering the labor
force after 2005, the authors keep ﬁxed cohort effects at the average value
of recent cohorts. Using these assumptions and official Census Bureau pro-
jections of the population including immigrants, the authors project a
steady downward trend in participation that reduces the aggregate partici-
pation rate by more than 3 percentage points by 2015. By comparison, this
is approximately how much participation rose during the 1970s, the decade
of the steepest increase in women’s participation. About 2 percentage points
of the decline comes from the aging of the baby-boomers, with the rest
coming from the model’s prediction of the change in participation within
age-sex groups. 
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projection. Model errors at the end of their sample period are small for
aggregate participation. However, in the last few years, participation was
well below predicted values among 16- to 19-year-olds and well above
predicted values for workers aged 62 and older. Treating these errors as age
group related has a negligible effect on overall participation projections
for 2015, with the higher participation for older workers adding about 
1⁄4 percentage point, and the lower participation for the youngest workers
subtracting about the same amount. If instead the recent model errors for
the youngest workers are treated as a cohort effect for this and subsequent
cohorts, the effect on the 2015 projection is much greater, reducing partic-
ipation by over 1 percentage point in that year and by growing amounts
thereafter. The authors also point out that projections of labor force partic-
ipation from their model would be sensitive to changes in their structural
variables, and they consider the effect that improved educational attainment
would have. They note that school enrollment rates for teenagers have risen
from about 60 percent in the late 1980s to nearly 75 percent in 2005.
Although these higher enrollment rates help explain the declining partici-
pation of the youngest workers, the authors ﬁnd it plausible that they may
lead to higher rates of college attainment as these cohorts mature. Estimat-
ing this effect by holding cohort effects constant at the 1984 level for
cohorts born after 1984 (rather than letting them decline as in their base-
line projection) raises 2015 aggregate participation by 
1⁄2 percentage point,
and by more thereafter. 
The authors go beyond their model to consider further evidence on the
nature of changes in participation in the most recent years, the period when
it is most difﬁcult to distinguish transitory cyclical variations from changes
in trends. This period is also the most important for projections, since future
trends take off from the estimated trend at the end of the sample. To exam-
ine this post-2000 period more closely, the authors conduct a cross-state
analysis of participation, using data spanning 1990–2005 and allowing for
a break in the trend and in cyclical sensitivity starting in 2001. Their sta-
tistical analysis relies on the nonsynchronous ﬂuctuations of labor demand
across states to identify the portion of participation changes that were unre-
lated to such ﬂuctuations and therefore represented trend rather than cycli-
cal effects. This analysis shows that cyclical and structural factors each
accounted for about half the post-2000 decline in participation, with little
change in cyclical sensitivity. This result is quite similar to the estimates
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obtain further insight on this period using data on gross labor force flows to
compare the most recent recession and recovery with predictions based on
historical estimates of the cyclical response. This exercise shows that ﬂows
from employment to nonparticipation were much larger than predicted in
recent years, a result that is inconsistent with a weak labor market, in which
workers would be unusually worried about ﬁnding a new job. This ﬁnding
further supports the importance of structural rather than cyclical forces in
the decline in participation in this period. 
The economy’s total labor input depends not only on participation rates
but also on the size of the working-age population and on average hours
worked. The authors turn briefly to these other two factors to round out
their projections of the future trend in labor input. Over the past decade,
population growth has averaged 1.2 percent a year, and the Census Bureau
projects a decline in this growth rate to about 0.9 percent a year by 2010
and 0.8 percent a year by 2015. The authors note that uncertainty about
net immigration is important in these projections and that estimates by the
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) and the Social Security Administration
(SSA) assume higher immigration ﬂows than the Census projects. Average
hours worked, as measured in the widely used Current Employment Sta-
tistics, trended down noticeably until the early 1980s and more gradually
thereafter. The authors discuss the several factors known to have inﬂuenced
the trend in hours, including changes in industrial composition and demo-
graphic changes. Using a Kalman filter model with controls for cyclical
conditions to calculate a trend for average hours, they estimate a trend
decline between 2000 and 2005 of 0.2 percent a year.
In their central projection, the authors estimate an aggregate participa-
tion rate in 2015 of 62.5 percent, compared with projections of 65.0 percent
from the CBO and 65.2 percent from the SSA. Combining their participa-
tion rates with Census population projections leads them to project a
substantial slowdown in labor force growth over this period. The CBO
and the SSAalso project slowdowns, but not as severe. In 2015 the authors
project the labor force will be only 4.0 percent larger than in 2005. This is
4.4 percentage points below the SSA’s projections and 3.7 percentage
points below the CBO’s. Using the authors’projections, if average hours
worked were to continue to decline at the 0.2 percent annual trend rate
they estimate for 2000 to 2005, total labor input would not be growing at all
by 2015. 
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uncertainty. They note the difficulty, discussed above, of capturing the
reasons for the recent participation behavior of the youngest and the oldest
workers and the uncertainty that this creates for projections. They also
observe that not only is it difﬁcult to project the number of immigrants who
will enter the country over the next decade, but the number that materializes
could affect the aggregate participation rate, since immigrants tend to have
higher than average participation rates. However, while emphasizing the
uncertainty around any point estimates, the authors conclude that demo-
graphic factors will almost certainly lead to a substantial slowing in labor
force growth over the coming decade. 
DURING THE DECADE OF the 1990s, the aggregate net worth of Americans
doubled, from $20 trillion to $42 trillion, despite a low and falling national
saving rate. Much of the increase in wealth reflected extraordinary gains
in the stock market, whose value grew by $12 trillion, and in housing dur-
ing the latter part of the period. These events, along with more widespread
diffusion of stock ownership and a substantial increase in participation in
and contributions to deﬁned-contribution pension plans, make this period
an especially rich one in which to examine household saving and wealth
accumulation. Previous research has examined the active saving of differ-
ent cohorts during this period, the asset composition of the growth in
wealth, and the extent to which households chose to use their additional
accumulated capital gains to ﬁnance increased consumption or early retire-
ment. These studies typically focused on tracking particular birth cohorts
through time. In the third article of this volume, William Gale and Karen
Pence take a different perspective, asking to what extent successive cohorts
of American households are wealthier than their predecessors. 
Focusing on the striking aggregate wealth increases of this period, Gale
and Pence explore how the wealth of individuals of a given age in 2001
compares with that of individuals of the same age in 1989. Data from the
1989–2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) enable them to exam-
ine not only differences in the level and composition of wealth for suc-
cessive cohorts, but also to hold constant demographic characteristics such
as marriage, health status, educational attainment, and time in the labor
force. They conclude that the median wealth of individuals of a given age
and set of demographic characteristics changed little over this period
despite the large aggregate capital gains that occurred. Remarkably, for
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cessive cohorts appear to explain almost all of the difference in their
median wealth. 
The authors begin by showing the differences in total real wealth
between 1989 and 2001 of successive cohorts at different ages, without
taking into account differences in their demographics. They deﬁne six age
groups (determined by the age of the head of household), with the youngest
aged 25–34 and the oldest 75–84, and they obtain data for about 500 house-
holds in each group. They find no significant increase in median wealth
between 1989 and 2001 for the first three age groups; indeed, the median
net worth of households with a head between the ages of 35 and 44 actually
fell from $108,000 in 1989 to $99,000 in 2001. Mean wealth does increase
for all three of these groups, but by only modest amounts. In contrast, both
median and mean wealth for the three older age groups increased substan-
tially. For example, median wealth for households with a head between
the ages of 65 and 74 increased by almost 60 percent over these twelve
years. This pattern is not restricted to the middle of the wealth distribution
but rather emerges across most of the distribution. However, the authors
note also that the pattern of increases is not uniform: for example, for the
65- to 74-year-olds there are significant increases at the 30th and the 
80th percentiles, but not the 90th. Plots of the cumulative distributions of
wealth for the 65–74 and 35–44 age groups in the two years also indicate
that not only the rich got richer: the distribution for the older age group
shifts upward over the entire range, and the 2001 distribution for 35- to
44-year-olds lies roughly on top of that for 1989. 
Are the increases in median wealth of the older age groups between the
two years concentrated in particular asset categories—for example, ﬁnan-
cial assets—where the extraordinary stock market gains might be expected
to show up? The SCF gives detail on the asset composition of wealth,
enabling the authors to examine differences in retirement assets, other
ﬁnancial assets, home equity, and “other” assets (which includes equity in
vehicles, investment real estate, and closely held businesses). The authors
also extend the SCF definition of retirement assets to include all defined-
contribution balances rather than only those under the household’s control
before retirement, and they make their own estimate of a household’s claim
on defined retirement benefits. They reason that excluding these assets
underestimates wealth and biases estimates of the change in wealth upward
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variety of types of deﬁned-contribution plans during the period. 
In general, the changes in the age profile of average holdings of the
various asset classes between 1989 and 2001 are similar to the changes in
the age profile of total net worth, but somewhat noisier. For the three
younger age groups there are only small differences in the holdings of most
asset classes across the twelve-year period, whereas for the three older age
groups the differences are substantial. Differences in the age profiles for
retirement assets mimic the differences in average wealth. But the age
profiles for the other assets have distinctive patterns, as do their differences
between 1989 and 2001. In 1989 home equity was almost the same for the
45–54, 55–64, and 65–74 age groups. In 2001, by contrast, a substantial
increase with age appears: home equity for the 65–74 age group was
roughly 40 percent greater than that for the 45–54 age group. In 1989 ﬁnan-
cial assets rose almost linearly with age; in 2001 ﬁnancial wealth behaved
similarly for the two youngest age groups, increased much more rapidly for
those in their middle years (more than doubling the 1989 level for the 
55–64 age group), and leveled off for the two oldest groups. The age
proﬁles for “other” wealth follow a similar pattern, but with the 75–84 age
group’s wealth almost identical in 1989 and 2001.
What explains the substantial gains in wealth of older households in
2001 compared with those of similar ages in 1989? An individual of a given
age in 2001 is a member of a cohort born twelve years later than an indi-
vidual of that age in 1989 and will have faced a different economic envi-
ronment than the earlier cohort at each stage of life. Consider, for example,
an individual who enters the labor force during a period of tight labor mar-
kets and high wages, or one who reaches middle age with substantial accu-
mulated assets just as the stock market enters a boom. These individuals
would be expected to have greater wealth, in middle age and later, than
someone who began his or her career in a weak labor market, or who faced
a declining stock market after accumulating a solid ﬁnancial nest egg. But
demographics matter for gains in wealth also. And even though the demo-
graphic characteristics of the population change slowly, substantial dif-
ferences can occur over twelve years. Although the authors’ ability to
investigate the importance of differences in economic environment over the
lifetime of a typical individual or household is limited by the short time
period covered by their data, they do have detailed information about the
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analyze. This enables them to investigate empirically the extent to which
changes in demographic characteristics alone explain the differences in
wealth for individuals of a given age in those two years. 
The authors utilize information on sex, marital status, health, education,
and labor force participation. They note that each of these demographic
characteristics might be expected to have signiﬁcant effects on wealth and
saving. Married households benefit from economies of scale; widowed
households typically face reduced pension and Social Security income;
healthy individuals may work more hours, spend more years in the labor
force, and have lower medical expenses; the better educated tend to have
better-paying jobs and to have better health, even controlling for income
and wealth; and longer participation in the labor force is likely to increase
lifetime earnings. 
The authors find that several of these demographic characteristics
“improved” for older households in 2001 compared with those in 1989,
which is consistent with their greater wealth, and did not improve or
actually deteriorated for younger households over the same period. For
example, both the share of married household heads and the share with
good health rose among older households, but among younger households
the married share decreased (perhaps because of a greater tendency to delay
marriage), and health, surprisingly, deteriorated. Perhaps because of rela-
tive improvement in the life expectancy of men, the share of households
headed by a widow in the 65–74 age group fell almost by half during the
period. Educational attainment rose substantially for females in all age
groups, but it rose more for successive older male cohorts than for younger
cohorts. Most notably, the share of men in the 65–74 age group with post-
secondary education increased from 31 percent in 1989 to 49 percent in
2001, whereas the share fell from 60 percent to 56 percent in the 
35–44 age group. Lifetime participation in the labor force increased for
females of all age groups. 
The authors ﬁrst examine the quantitative importance of these changes
between 1989 and 2001 in the demographic characteristics of the different
cohorts by estimating wealth equations for each of the six age groups. They
allow a different intercept for the two years and run the regressions with
and without the demographic variables, which are constrained to have the
same effect in each year when they are included. Thirteen demographic
variables are considered: dummy variables are used to distinguish post-
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from “excellent or good” health, entered separately for males and females;
three dummies are used for marital status—married, second marriage,
and divorced or separated (single or widowed is the omitted category);
an additional dummy is included for female-headed households to capture
gender-based differences in the impact of divorce or death of a spouse.
Continuous variables are used for years married, years since divorce or
death of a spouse, age of household head, and years working full time
(entered separately for males and females). The authors estimate “median”
regressions, minimizing the sum of absolute deviations for two specifica-
tions of functional form: one in absolute levels, and the other using a wealth
transformation that is much like the logarithmic but avoids the problem of
taking logarithms when some observations are negative or near zero. The
results are qualitatively similar for the two speciﬁcations. 
The regressions without the demographic variables support the conclu-
sions drawn from the earlier plots of age profiles of wealth for the years
1989 and 2001. Median wealth for each of the three younger age groups is
statistically indistinguishable across the two years. In contrast, the differ-
ences in median wealth are large and highly signiﬁcant for the three older
age groups: wealth is greater in 2001 than in 1989 by amounts ranging from
$66,000 for the 55–64 age group to $95,000 for the 74–85 age group, in the
regression using the absolute wealth speciﬁcation. Inclusion of the demo-
graphic variables does not change the conclusion that there is no statisti-
cally significant difference for the younger age profiles between the two
years. For the older ages the statistically significant differences remain
when only certain subsets of the demographic variables are included, but
not when all the demographic variables remain in the equation. It appears
that changes in birth cohorts’demographic characteristics explain virtu-
ally all the differences in median wealth between 1989 and 2001. 
What are the estimated partial effects on wealth of the changes in
particular demographic variables? The authors report coefﬁcient estimates
from median regressions pooling 1989 and 2001 data for two age groups,
35–44 and 65–74. For both age groups nine of the thirteen variables are sta-
tistically significant. Most of the coefficients are of meaningful size and
have the expected sign. For both males and females, postsecondary educa-
tion is “worth” over $70,000 in added wealth for the younger age group and
more than triple that for the older group. “Fair or poor” health reduces
wealth, in the case of the 65–74 age group by $79,000 and $97,000 for men
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wealth than single or divorced households. The effects of years working,
years married, and years since divorce or death of a spouse are small, as are
differences in age within the age group. 
In the regressions discussed thus far, the demographic variables are
constrained to have the same effect on wealth in 1989 and in 2001. In prin-
ciple, changes in average wealth of a given age group across the period
could be apportioned between differences in the coefﬁcients (betas) on the
demographic characteristics (that is, in the magnitude of the effect of a
given characteristic on wealth) and changes in the characteristics them-
selves. To examine this possibility, the authors estimate separate ordinary
least squares equations for the two years. Although the estimated coeffi-
cients differ, only a few of the differences are statistically significant.
Algebraically, the change in mean wealth for a given age group can be
decomposed into the differences in the betas for the two years times the
average values of the demographic characteristics in one year, plus the
differences in the average values of the demographic characteristics times
the values of the betas in the other year. In conducting this decomposition,
the authors focus only on the older age groups where there is a signiﬁcant
difference in average wealth for the two years. They ﬁnd that about half of
the wealth increase for the 55–64 age group and essentially all of the
increase for the two oldest age groups can be attributed to changes in demo-
graphic characteristics. Decompositions based on the estimates using the
nonlinear transformation of wealth described above show that, for all three
older age groups, essentially all of the increase can be attributed to demo-
graphics. 
Even though differences in demographics appear to explain the differ-
ences in the median and average wealth of individuals of the same age in
different years, much of the variation in wealth among individuals with
the same characteristics is inevitably unexplained in these regressions. Is
the distribution of household wealth in 2001 similar to the 1989 distribution
once changes in demographics are taken into account? The authors use
two complicated procedures to address this question. The first effectively
reweights the households in the 1989 sample so that they reﬂect the distri-
bution of demographic characteristics in 2001. The actual wealth of a 1989
household with particular demographic characteristics is used rather than
its predicted wealth from a median regression. In effect, the 2001 distri-
bution is the weighted sum of the actual wealth in the 1989 sample of
xxviii Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006households sorted by their demographics, with weights that reflect the
relative frequency of those demographics in 2001 rather than in 1989.
The second procedure estimates individual “centile” regressions on the
1989 data, with each regression placing different weights on the individual
observations so as to best fit different centiles of the error distribution.
The high-centile regressions, for example, place heavy weight on the
extremely high wealth observations. As a result, the coefficients on the
demographic variables are likely to be quite different from those estimated
by a median or a mean regression. Although the high- and low-centile betas
do a better job of “explaining” the extreme observations, and hence the
entire distribution of wealth, it is difficult to give them a structural inter-
pretation. In effect, variation in the centile betas substitutes for the large
residual errors that remain using a median regression. The authors use a
random draw from the estimated distribution of 1989 centile betas to fore-
cast the wealth of a randomly selected 2001 household with a particular
set of demographics. This procedure is repeated over and over again to
generate the hypothetical wealth distribution for 2001. Because of the
random selection of centile betas, 10 percent of the households with given
demographics will have wealth forecasted using the top 10 percent centile
betas, another 10 percent with those same demographics will have wealth
forecasted using the 80 to 90 percent centile betas, and so forth.
The authors show that, with the exception of the 75–84 age group, both
procedures generate 2001 wealth distributions very similar to those actually
observed. The authors regard these results as the most persuasive evidence
that demographic characteristics are a signiﬁcant determinant of the greater
wealth of the older households in 2001. However, it is difficult to know
whether the similarity in the hypothetical and the actual 2001 distributions
reﬂects anything more than similarity of the error distributions for the two
years and the shift in the median implied by the median regressions—in
other words, whether changes in demographics are responsible for the
realistic appearance of the hypothetical 2001 wealth distribution.
All of the analysis thus far has focused on explaining the wealth of
different birth cohorts reaching the same age in different calendar years.
Tracking instead the experience of given birth cohorts over time might pro-
vide additional insight into the importance of capital gains in explaining
increases in wealth over time. The SCF does not track a fixed panel of
households. Therefore the authors examine the experience of a “synthetic”
panel, comparing, for example, households aged 45–54 in 2001 with house-
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with the stock and residential real estate holdings of the cohort in 1989
and add an estimate of capital gains in each asset that accrued over the
1989–2001 period. They also allow for differences in mortality rates by
education and by sex. They do not take into account any active saving
during the period, but they remove bequests and exclude the value of
privately held business, investment real estate, and deﬁned-beneﬁt wealth.
Using these data, the authors find that the share of the change in wealth
explained by capital gains increases as one moves through the successive
2001 age groups: It is about a fifth for the cohort aged 45–54 in 2001, a
third for the cohort aged 55–64, and three-ﬁfths for the cohort aged 65–74.
For the oldest group the change in wealth is more than explained—imply-
ing that this group actively dissaved or received bequests, or both. The
authors conclude that capital gains do not come close to explaining all the
wealth accumulation for the cohorts likely to be in the accumulation stage
of the life cycle. 
The authors see their main results as serving “to highlight a long, but
sometimes downgraded, tradition in economics—dating back at least to the
original formulation of the life-cycle model by Franco Modigliani and
coauthors—that emphasizes the role of demographic variables in wealth
accumulation.” They note that the same demographic factors that appear
to have fueled the increase in wealth also are likely to raise the expendi-
ture needed to maintain living standards in retirement. Married households
consume more than single households, more highly educated households
likely have had (and will want to sustain) higher consumption than less
educated ones, and healthy households may have lower medical expenses
but will also live longer, on average, and thus have to finance a longer
retirement. The authors observe that the prospects may be particularly unfa-
vorable for the baby-boom generation, who, despite having lived through
the bull market of the 1990s, had no more wealth, on average, in 2001 than
their 1989 counterparts. Based on their findings, the authors suggest that
policies that raise investment in health, education, and other forms of
human capital could have far-reaching consequences for saving and wealth
accumulation.
DEFINED-BENEFIT PENSIONS ARE an important source of retirement security
for many workers. Unlike deﬁned-contribution plans, in which retirement
beneﬁts depend on the returns on the assets in the employee’s own account,
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the responsibility of the plan sponsor, generally the employing firm or, in
a few cases, a group of ﬁrms. Although the relative importance of DB plans
has been shrinking steadily, they still insure 44 million participants and, as
of 2001, held $1.8 trillion in assets. Over thirty years ago, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) established rules governing DB
plans and created the Public Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), funded
by premiums paid by DB sponsors, to insure workers’promised benefits.
By most measures this system has worked well. However, in recent years
the ﬁnancial position of the PBGC has deteriorated, as several large ﬁrms
with underfunded plans have gone bankrupt and others appear likely to fol-
low, posing a substantial risk of much higher claims on the PBGC in the
future. These developments have raised questions about the future of the
public insurance system and of DB plans themselves. In the ﬁnal article of
this volume, David Wilcox examines the rules governing DB plans and
the PBGC, discusses the sources of the current problems and future risks,
and proposes a comprehensive reform of the system. 
As background to his analysis, Wilcox describes the principles under-
lying simple DB plans. Such plans promise covered workers an annuity
determined by their employment history, and plan sponsors are required to
support this promise through payments into the pension fund and the invest-
ment income from the fund’s assets. If the market value of those assets
matches the present value of the plan’s future liabilities—and an ideal set of
regulations would ensure that this is the case—the DB plan is fully funded.
In contrast to this ideal, Wilcox identifies a number of deficiencies in the
present system and associates them with different types of risks to which
they give rise. Current regulations allow ﬁrms to systematically underfund
their obligations. When a plan sponsor fails, limits on the PBGC’s guaran-
tees may leave some workers with lower beneﬁts than they were promised.
PBGC insurance is mispriced in a way that encourages both firms and
workers to take excessive risk. This mispricing leaves taxpayers and
healthy ﬁrms to bear the risk of having to shore up the PBGC should it need
additional funding to bail out failed plans. Investors have difﬁculty properly
evaluating the ﬁnancial condition of plans under current accounting rules,
resulting in inefﬁcient valuation of ﬁrms in ﬁnancial markets. In addition,
the regulations governing the present system are highly complex, resulting
in added costs to ﬁrms with DB plans and compromising the ability of the
PBGC to oversee them properly. 
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and, having arisen, to be corrected only very gradually. He provides details
of the complex regulations under which DB plans operate and the
departures from an ideal system to which they give rise. Two particularly
important examples illustrate how present rules contribute to the under-
funding problem. In so-called ﬂat-beneﬁt plans (a common type of DB plan
in which contractually promised beneﬁts are not tied to wage increases but
grow only in proportion with years of service), the only way of adjusting
for nominal wage growth is through frequent revisions in the DB plan spec-
iﬁcations. But under ERISA, any top-up funding required because of such
revisions may be amortized over thirty years. As a result, current assets do
not cover the present value of future liabilities even for some funds that
are in legal compliance. One study found that ﬂat-beneﬁt plans accounted
for 90 percent of total liabilities taken over by the PBGC. Shutdown bene-
fits pose another significant problem. These arise from plant closings or
permanent layoffs and may call for full benefits to be paid before the
affected workers reach traditional retirement age. Yet the possibility that
shutdown beneﬁts will be paid is typically ignored in determining a plan’s
funding requirements, and the PBGC recently estimated that they could add
$15 billion to its liabilities in coming years. Funding shortfalls also arise
from ﬂuctuations in the value of pension fund assets, particularly equities.
Such shortfalls may not be reﬂected in fund accounting until several quar-
ters after they occur, and sponsors are allowed an extended time beyond
that to make up for them. As a striking example, Wilcox reports that, in
September 2000, Bethlehem Steel had 73 percent of its DB plan assets
invested in equities. The value of plan assets declined by 25 percent over
the next year and by another 23 percent the year after that, at which time the
plan was terminated. 
Although the extent of underfunding provides a warning of potential
claims on the PBGC, its liabilities formally materialize only when an
underfunded plan is terminated. Wilcox notes that a sponsor may termi-
nate its DB plan if it is in bankruptcy proceedings or has persuaded the
PBGC that it must terminate in order to stay in business, and the PBGC
itself may terminate a plan if it determines that its own liabilities will
increase unreasonably if it does not. Wilcox also describes the circum-
stances under which the insurance obligation of the PBGC may not cover
the full amount promised to all workers. For plans terminating in 2006,
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fits from the PBGC at age sixty-five. And the PBGC is required only to
meet a fraction of benefit improvements implemented in the five years
before a plan is terminated. 
Wilcox also notes that the insurance premiums that the PBGC charges
are not related either to the risk of the sponsor’s business or to the risk
of the assets in the fund’s portfolio. The annual cost to sponsors is
presently $30 per participant plus a variable-rate premium of $9 per
$1,000 of unfunded liability. However, most unfunded liability is exempt
from this variable premium for various reasons, so that even the observ-
able risk in the funding balance is not reflected in premiums. These rates
appear to be extremely low in light of historical experience with current
regulations.
Before turning to the specific pension reforms he advocates, Wilcox
presents three axioms that, he argues, should guide reform. The first
axiom is that workers should bear no risk for the benefits promised to
them. Since workers already bear own-firm risk, a riskless pension
promise permits workers and their sponsor firms to reach a more efficient
compensation arrangement. The second axiom is that taxpayers should
not bear the burden of the risk involved in insuring pensions. The third
is that low-risk sponsors should not have to cross-subsidize the insur-
ance of high-risk sponsors. Such subsidies would tend to drive low-risk
firms out of the DB plan system, leaving a riskier pool of plans for the
PBGC to insure.
Wilcox divides the present problem confronting the PBGC into two
parts: dealing with the overhang of existing and potential liabilities, and
designing a system for the future that would satisfy his three axioms. Of the
three options for dealing with the present overhang—taxpayers footing
the bill, surviving sponsors paying economically unfair premiums, or the
PBGC defaulting on its obligations—he favors the first on the grounds
that a taxpayer bailout would make good on the government’s promise as
it is widely understood, without heightening the risk of an exodus from
the DB system. For the future he notes that a new system would have 
to make changes of three sorts: tightening funding and portfolio rules,
rationalizing the pricing of the PBGC’s insurance, and improving the
information provided about DB funds in firm’s financial reports, in the
government budget, and to workers. 
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plan sponsors’required contributions should be determined. Sponsors
should be required to fund beneﬁt accruals each year and to amortize any
shortfalls much faster than at present, all on a mark-to-market basis. Meet-
ing this requirement would require the following main changes, which
would also simplify current law: First, a single measure of beneﬁt accruals
should be used, discounting future benefits at a risk-free rate. Second, all
funding gaps, regardless of their source, should be closed within five to
seven years, which would also eliminate the need for complicated advance
funding requirements for seriously underfunded plans, as under present
law. Third, benefit increases under flat-benefit plans should be treated
either as current-year benefit accruals or as amendments, with the result-
ing funding gap to be closed promptly; the potential costs of shutdown
benefits should also be recognized and funded promptly. Fourth, PBGC
guarantees for plan changes, including shutdown benefits, should be
phased in over the same period that the corresponding funding gaps are
closed. Fifth, any subsidized portion of early-retirement beneﬁts or lump-
sum payments should not be made out of pension assets and should not
be insured by the PBGC. Sixth, a plan should be frozen whenever the
sponsor is delinquent in making payments. Finally, all plan assets should
be valued at current market prices.
To immunize DB plan funds from valuation swings, Wilcox reasons that
portfolios should be restricted to high-quality debt instruments structured to
deliver cash flows as benefit obligations become due. Similarly, for its
own portfolio, he would restrict PBGC to investing entirely in zero-coupon
bonds structured to mature as its obligations become due. Since these obli-
gations derive from plans already terminated, they are known with certainty
up to mortality risk. Wilcox discusses various issues associated with mov-
ing to a rational pricing structure for PBGC insurance. He notes that pen-
sion analysts have developed models that attempt to price the several risks
that exist: aggregate economic risk and sponsor-specific bankruptcy risk
as well as risks associated with the pension plan’s financing. He suggests
that further experience with such models is needed before risk-based
premiums are introduced. Wilcox also discusses ways in which the ﬁnan-
cial positions of DB plans could be made more transparent, and budgetary
and accounting requirements could be improved. 
Wilcox recognizes that his aggressive approach to DB pension reform
may go further than necessary. His main proposed reforms are deliberately
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makes the other reforms less necessary. For example, if fund assets are con-
tinually marked to market and funding gaps are closed promptly, the risk
associated with keeping some equities in a portfolio is reduced. Wilcox
nonetheless recommends adoption of all of his reforms on the practical
grounds that not all reforms may be adopted simultaneously and that, even
if they were, the cost of their redundancy might be very low. 
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